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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the district court erroneously granted summary

judgment for Plaintiffs.

The determination of whether a party is

entitled to summary judgment is a conclusion of law, which is
reviewed for correctness with no deference given to the district
court.

Parker

v. Salt

Lake

v. Dodgion,
County,

971 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1998);

855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993) .

Higgins

Moreover,

Mi]t is well-settled that an appellate court may affirm a trial
court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court
relied on some other ground."

DeBry v. Noble,

889 P.2d 428, 444

(Utah 1995).
2.

Whether the district court utilized the proper standard

of review in the course of granting summary judgment.
legal issue that is reviewed for correctness.
Citizens

for Better

336 (Utah 1999).

Community v. City

of Springville,

See

This is a
Springville

979 P.2d 332,

"It is well-settled that an appellate court may

affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though
the trial court relied on some other ground."
P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995).

6

DeBry v. Noble,

889

3.

Whether the total lack of evidence supporting the City

Council's denial of Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application was
supported by substantial evidence.
reviewed for correctness.
Community

v.

City

of

See

This is a legal issue that is

Springville

Springville,

Citizens

for

Better

979 P.2d 332, 336 (Utah 1999).

"It is well-settled that an appellate court may affirm a trial
court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court
relied on some other ground."

DeBry v. Noble,

889 P.2d 428, 444

(Utah 1995) .
4.

If the court determines that the "reasonably debatable"

standard of judicial review is applicable to the instant case, the
issue is whether the total lack of evidence supporting the City
Council's denial

of Plaintiffs' R-2-75

rezone application is

reasonable to the point that it is reasonably debatable.
a legal issue that is reviewed for correctness.
Citizens

for Better

336 (Utah 1999).

Community v. City

of Springville,

See

This is
Springville

979 P. 2d 332,

"It is well-settled that an appellate court may

affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though
the trial court relied on some other ground."
P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995).

7

DeBry v. Noble,

889

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
and regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments
of the instant brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves an adverse land use decision by the Payson
City Council concerning Plaintiffs' property (also referred to as
"the Property"), which is governed by The Municipal Land Use
Development and Management Act set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9101, et seq.

The Payson City Council's decision was an arbitrary

and capricious denial of Plaintiffs' application to rezone their
property from R-l-A to R-2-75.

Plaintiffs sought to have their

property rezoned from the R-l-A residential designation to the R-275 higher density multi-family zoning designation.
Plaintiffs initiated this action, claiming the City Council's
denials of their rezone requests were arbitrary and capricious, and
that the denials constituted a taking without just compensation.
Thereafter, Payson City Corporation filed a motion for summary
judgment, demanding that the district court dismiss the complaint
because the Payson City Council had acted within its legislative
prerogative.

Plaintiffs responded and filed a motion for summary

8

judgment, arguing that the City Council's decisions were arbitrary
and capricious.
At the initially scheduled hearing for oral arguments on the
motions for summary judgment, the district court expressed concern
about the lack of basis to deny the rezone requests in the minutes
of the public hearings on the rezone applications.

Consequently,

the district court directed Payson City Corporation to prepare
findings setting forth the basis of the City Council's decisions.
Shortly thereafter, the City submitted Findings of the City Council
Decision, setting forth the reasons why the City Council denied
Plaintiffs' rezone applications.
After hearing oral arguments on the cross-motions for summary
judgment, the district court took the matter under advisement.

By

way of Memorandum Decision, the district court granted Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Payson City Corporation's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Shortly thereafter, the district

court signed its final Order concerning the foregoing.

Payson City

Corporation subsequently filed this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs provide the following Statement of Facts to the
extent that the Statement of Facts in Payson City Corporation's
Brief fails to accurately or adequately state bhe applicable facts:

9

1.

At the time Plaintiff's applied for a rezone, the subject

property was located within an area zoned as R-l-A, which is a
residential zone with some large animal rights (R. 79, Payson City
Corporation's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
Hi; R. 70-71, Affidavit of Andy Hall in Support of Payson City
Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment, %2);
2.

Plaintiffs' property is surrounded by property designated

as R-l-A for residential use (R. 42, Payson Planning Zone Map).1
Not more than two and one-half blocks east of the Property,
however, is a large, expansive piece of property that is designated
as R-2-75, which is the same zoning designation that was requested
by Plaintiffs (See
3.

id.);

The 1995 Payson City General Plan states that residential

areas should be encouraged to locate east of the 1-15 buffer, and
that zoning ordinances that utilize 1-15 as a buffer should be
enacted (See R. 50 and 52, Payson City General Plan 1995) .2

In

direct contrast, the Official Payson City General Plan Map, which

x

The Payson Planning Zone Map in the record on appeal reveals
that this R-2-75 property abutting the subject property is located on
both the west and east sides of 1-15 (R. 42, Payson Planning Zone
Map) .
2

The Payson City General Plan also establishes the policy of
providing for a "mixture of residential densities" by zoning
"locations for low, medium, and high density housing." (See R. 51,
Payson City General Plan 1995).
10

was adopted July 5, 1995, provides for large areas of residential
use west of 1-15 (See R. 43, Official General Plan Map);
4.
to

In January 1996, Plaintiffs submitted their application

rezone

their property

residential

zoning

from R-l-A

designation

that

to R-2-75, which
permits

multiple

is a
family

dwellings (See R. 177-78, Zoning Change Application; Affidavit of
Andy Hall in Support of Payson City Corporation's Motion for
Summary Judgment, *|3) /
5.

On

February

8,

1996,

Plaintiffs'

R-2-75

rezone

application came before the Planning Commission (See R. 166-67,
Payson Planning Commission Meeting Minutes, February 8, 1996).
During the meeting, the Commission engaged in general discussion
about the rezone request and the character of the property, which
included an acknowledgment by Chairman Stewart that because "there
are already other residential developments in the surrounding area
where this rezone would take place, there may not be a problem in
rezoning this to R-2-7500." (See id.).

The Planning Commission

then voted to recommend to the Payson City Council that a public
hearing be held on the rezone to R-2-75
6.
20,

{Id.);

By way of a Planning Commission Staff Report, dated March

1996, the Staff recommended that the Planning Commission

recommend approval to the Payson City Council of Plaintiffs' R-2-75
rezone application (See R. 173, Planning Commission Staff Report);
11

7.

A public hearing on Plaintiff's rezone application was

held before the Planning Commission on March 20, 1996 (See R. 15355, Payson City Planning Commission Meeting Minutes, March 20,
1996) . At the public hearing, a petition signed by thirty-eight
people was submitted to the Commission by a neighborhood group that
opposed the zoning change to R-2-75 (See id.
Petition).

at R. 155; R. 159-60,

In addition to the Petition, thirteen individuals

expressed their opposition to the R-2-75 rezone (See R. 154-55,
Payson City Planning Commission Meeting Minutes, March 20, 1996).3
After the public comments, the Planning Commission recommended that
the Payson City Council deny the R-2-75 rezone (See id.
8.

at R. 153) ;

A few minutes after the Planning Commission adjourned,

the Payson City Council held a public hearing on the R-2-75 rezone
application (See R. 231-33, Payson City Council Meeting Minutes,
March 20, 1996) .

During the hearing, the Planning and Zoning

Chairperson informed the City Council that the Planning Commission
had just met "and after considering the public input, voted to deny
the zone change." (See id.

at R. 231). As with the public hearing

before the Planning Commission, the thirty-eight signature Petition
was submitted to the City Council by the neighborhood group that
opposed the zoning change to R-2-75 (See id.
3

at R. 232). Subject

Only five individuals spoke in favor of the R-2-75 rezone, four
of which had an interest in the requested rezone (See R. 154-55,
Payson City Planning Commission Meeting Minutes, March 20, 1996).
12

to one or two exceptions, the same individuals appeared before the
City Council as did before the Planning Commission (See id.
33).

at 232-

One exception was Mr. Jim Wilbert, an expert with twenty

years of planning experience, who spoke in favor of the rezone
because it "allows for affordable housing near the industrial
park." (See id.

at 232) . The City Council voted to deny the R-2-75

rezone "based on the General Plan recommendation, traffic concerns
relating to the industrial park, and [the Planning Commission's]
recommendation." (See id.
9,

at R. 231);

An Interoffice Memo from the Planning Commission to the

City Council, dated May 10, 1996, explaining the reasons for
recommending denial of the R-2-75 rezone application states, "The
Planning Commission recommendation to the City Council was to not
approve the [R-2-75] zone change jbecause of the opposition
neighbors

10.

in

that

area."

(See

R.

of

the

110-11, Interoffice Memo);

Plaintiffs submitted a second Zoning Change Application,

requesting that their property be rezoned from R-l-A to R-1-9 (See
R. 145, Zoning Change Application; R. 334, Findings of City Council
Decision, f3) . Both the Planning Commission Staff and the Planning
Commission recommended approval of the R-1-9 rezone (See R. 140,
Planning Commission Staff Report, dated April 11, 1996; R. R. 12223, Payson City Planning Commission Meeting Minutes, dated April
11, 1996).

After a public hearing during a City Council meeting,
13

the City Council voted to deny the R-l-9 rezone request (See R.
222-23, Payson City Council Meeting Minutes, dated May 22, 1996);
11.

Plaintiffs appealed the Payson City Council's denials of

their rezone requests by filing a Verified Complaint in Fourth
District Court, alleging the Payson City Council's denials of their
rezone requests were arbitrary and capricious, and that the denials
constituted a taking without just compensation.

(See R. 2-16,

Verified Complaint);
12.

Payson City Corporation filed a motion for summary

judgment, demanding that the district court dismiss the complaint
because the Payson City Council had acted within its legislative
prerogative (See R. 33-79, Payson City Corporation's Motion for
Summary Judgment and supporting Memorandum).

Plaintiffs responded

and filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the City
Council's decisions were arbitrary and capricious (See R. 86-191,
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Response in Opposition
to

Defendant's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

and

supporting

Memorandum of Points and Authorities);
13.

At the initially scheduled hearing for oral arguments on

the motions for summary judgment

(see R. 281, Notice of Oral

Arguments), the district court expressed concern about the lack of
basis to deny the rezone in the minutes of the public hearings on
the rezone applications (See R. 445, Transcript of Hearing Held
14

September 8, 1998, p. 3, lines 1-11, p. 4-5).

Consequently, the

district court directed Payson City Corporation to prepare findings
setting forth the basis of the City Council's decisions to deny the
rezone

(See R. 282, Minutes Oral Arguments; R. 284-85, Order).

Shortly thereafter, the City submitted Findings of the City Council
Decision, setting forth the reasons why the City Council denied
Plaintiffs' rezone applications (See R. 285-334, Findings of City
Council Decision [sic]).

The Findings were substantially the same,

if no identical, in terms of providing the basis for the City
Council's denials of the rezone requests;
14.

After hearing the parties' oral arguments on the cross-

motions for summary judgment, the district court took the matter
under advisement

(See R. 44 6, Transcript of Hearing Held January

15, 1999, p. 32, lines 22-25);
15.

By way of Memorandum Decision, the district court granted

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Payson City
Corporation's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment

(See

R.

341-43,

Memorandum Decision, a true and correct copy of which is attached
hereto as Addendum A) .

The district court determined that the

Payson City Council's denial of Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone request
was arbitrary and capricious (See id.

at R. 342) . Because the City

Council's denial of Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone request was arbitrary
and capricious, the district court stated that it need not address
15

or

"analyze

the denial of the

application (See id.

[Plaintiffs']

second

[rezone]

at R. 341). Shortly thereafter, the district

court signed its final Order (See R. 344-45, Order);
16.

Payson City Corporation subsequently filed Notice of

Appeal (See R. 349-51, Notice of Appeal).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The correct standard for judicial review of land use

decisions, such as that in the instant case, is enunciated in Utah
Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (3) (b) and is set forth by the recent Utah
Supreme Court
Community

v.

decision

City

of

in Springville

Springville.

Citizens

for

a

Better

The plain language of Utah Code

Ann. § 10-9-1001, in conjunction with the Utah Supreme Court's
definitive interpretation of that statute in Springville
now

supersedes

any

prior

law,

case

law

or

Citizens,

otherwise, that

recognizes a difference in the standards of review concerning city
council administrative vis-a-vis legislative actions.
2.

In the course of granting summary judgment, the district

court utilized the correct standard for judicial review of land use
decisions, which is enunciated in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3)(b),
and which is set forth in the recent Utah Supreme Court decision in

Springville

Citizens

for a Better

Community v. City of

16

Springville.

3.

The district

court applied

the correct

standard of

judicial review set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 and as
enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in Springville
4.

Citizens.

The Payson City Council's denial of the R-2-75 rezone

request was arbitrary and capricious because it was not supported
by substantial evidence, which is required by Utah Code Ann. § 109-1001 and the Springville
5.

Assuming,

Citizens

arguendo,

case.

that

the

"reasonably debatable"

standard of judicial review applies to the City Council's decision,
the undisputed facts demonstrate that the city council's denial of
plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application was arbitrary and capricious.
In the instant case, the record indisputably reveals that the City
Council relied merely on public comment in the course of denying
Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application.
provided by the City Council

Moreover, the reasons

for its denial were

in direct

contradiction to the actual facts and circumstances surrounding the
proposed rezone.

Hence, the reasonableness of the City Council's

decision is not even "fairly debatable."

ARGUMENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Summary judgment

is appropriate only when there are no

genuine issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment

17

as a matter of law."
v. City

Springville

of Springville,

Civ. P. 56(c);4 accord

Citizens

For a Better

979 P.2d 332, 336 (1999); see also
Parker

(Utah 1998) (quoting Higgins

v. Dodgion,

v. Salt

Community
Utah R.

971 P.2d 496, 496-97

Lake County,

855 P. 2d 231, 235

(Utah 1993)) . "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we do not
defer to the legal conclusions of the district court, but review
them for correctness."
Parker,

Springville

971 P. 2d at 497; Higgins,

Citizens,

979 P. 2d at 336;

855 P. 2d at 235.

"When reviewing

a municipality's land use decision, our review is limited to
determining 'whether . . . the decision is arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal." Id.

il.

(citing Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) (b) (1996)) .

THE CORRECT STANDARD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF i.AJMH
USE DECISIONS, WHICH T.S ENUNCIATED IN UTAH CODE
ANN- § 10-9-1001(3)(b), IS SET FORTH BY THE RECENT
UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISION IN Springville
Citizens
for a Better
Community v. City of
Springville.

4

Rule 56(c) provides in relevant part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories,
and
admissions
on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
18

Although, as advanced in recent Utah case law,5 there existed
extensive case law in 1991 stating different standards of judicial
review for administrative and legislative land use decisions, the
Utah Legislature enacted a "one-size-fits-all standard of review"
for "municipality [] land use decisions"6 when it passed what is now
known as Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001.
1001(3) (b) (1999); Harmon City,

Inc.

See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-

v. Draper

City,

Rep. 24, 30 (Utah Ct. App. February 10, 2000)
Jackson).

388 Utah Adv.
(dissenting, J.

According to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3), "The courts

shall: (a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are
valid; and

(b) determine only whether or not the decision is

arbitrary, capricious, or illegal."
In Springville

Citizens,

the Utah Supreme Court took the broad

and plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 at face value, as
it should, questioning not whether the Utah Legislature intended
that two different standards of judicial review result from the

5

See Harmon City,

Inc.

v. Draper

City,

3 88 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 25

n.5 (Utah Ct. App. February 10, 2000) (comparing Marshall
v.
Salt
Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704, 705-06 (1943) with Xanthos v.
Board of Adjustment
of Salt Lake City,
685 P. 2d 1032, 1035 (Utah
1984)) .
6

Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(1), which governs appeals and
enforcement of municipal land use decisions, states, "No person may
challenge in district court a municipality's
land use decisions
made
under this chapter or under the regulation
made under authority
of
this
chapter
until that person has exhausted his administrative
remedies." (Emphasis added).
19

single and simple standard set forth in that statute.
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court, in Springville

Citizens,

to

and

distinguish

functions.

between

Rather,

the

the

administrative

supreme

court, without

Id.7

refused

legislative
reservation,

accepted the Legislature's plain language and thereby made the
"sweeping statement" that ua municipality's land use decision is
arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported by substantial
evidence."
Harmon City,

Springville

Citizens,

979 P.2d 332, 336 (Utah 1999);

3 88 Utah Adv. Rep. at 30.

Notwithstanding the views of this Court or the views of Payson
City Corporation concerning the appropriate standard of judicial
review for reviewing the City Council's denial of Plaintiffs' R-275 rezone application in the instant case, the only recourse for
this Court, according to principles of stare decisis, is to follow
the supreme court's clear command in Springville

Citizens.

See

7

The Utah Supreme Court's reading of the standard of judicial
review set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 is consistent with
well-established standard rules of statutory construction.
See
Wilson

v.

Valley

Mental

Health,

969

P.2d

416, 418

(Utah 1998)

(appellate court looks first to plain language "as the best indicator
of the legislature's intent and purpose in passing the statute");
Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic,
Inc. v. Frederick,
890 P. 2d
1017, 1019 (Utah 1995) (statute should generally be construed
according to its plain language); Brinkerhoff
v. Forsyth,
779 P.2d
685, 686 (Utah 1989) (same); Savage Indus.,
Inc. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 811 P. 2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991) (statutory words are to be read
literally unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or
inoperable); Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74, 80 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
(same) .
20

Harmon

City,

3 88 Utah Adv.

Rep.

precedential effect" of Springville

at

30

Citizens

(discussing
case).

"direct

Consequently,

the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001, in conjunction
with the Utah Supreme Court's definitive interpretation of that
statute in Springville

Citizens,

now supersedes any prior law, case

law or otherwise, that recognizes a difference in the standards of
review concerning city council administrative vis-a-vis legislative
Id.

actions.

III. THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-91001 AND AS ENUNCIATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN

Springville
"A

Citizens.

municipality's

capricious

if

Springville

Citizens

land

it is not

use

decision

supported

for a Better

by

Adjustment,

arbitrary

Community v. City of

893 P.2d 602, 604

and

substantial evidence."

979 P.2d 332, 336 (Utah 1999) (citing Patterson
of

is

Springville,

v. Utah County

(Utah Ct. App. 1995).

Bd.
"In

evaluating the City's decision under this standard, [the appellate
court] review [s] the evidence in the record to ensure that the City
proceeded within the limits of fairness and acted in good faith."
Id.

w

[The appellate court] also determine[s] whether, in light of

the evidence before the City, a reasonable mind could reach the
same conclusion as the City."
American

Law

of

Zoning,

§

Id.

(also citing 2 Young,

11.11,
21

at

461

(4th

ed.

Anderson's
1996))

(Parenthetical statement omitted).

"[The appellate court] do[es]

not, however, weigh the evidence anew or substitute [its] judgment
for that of the municipality."
604 and Xanthos

v.

Board

Id.

(citing Patterson,

of Adjustment,

893 P.2d at

685 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah

1984)) .
Payson City Corporation argues in its Brief that the district
court incorrectly "viewed himself as conducting a plenary review
which would allow him to make an independent decision based on the
facts

set

forth

in the

legislative

record."

See

Brief of

Appellant, p. 17 (citing R. 446, Transcript of Hearing Held January
15, 1999, p. 3) . A review of the discussion set forth in the cited
transcript in the context of the complete record reveals that
Payson City Corporation's argument is without merit.

Initially,

Payson City Corporation's "plenary review" argument is troubling
because at the time the district court's comments were made, Payson
City Corporation's legal counsel made absolutely no effort to
object to or correct the unintentional misperception by the trial
court concerning plenary review.

Consequently, principles of

waiver and invited error apply, precluding Payson City Corporation
from now complaining of the alleged error.

See State

v.

Anderson,

929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996) ("a party cannot take advantage of
an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court
into committing the error"); see also
22

State

v. Kiriluk,

975 P. 2d

469, 475

(Utah Ct • App. 1999)

(hold that manifest

injustice

exception has no application in cases where the party invited the
very error complained of on appeal).

Nevertheless, the district

court's comments concerning plenary review were harmless for two
reasons.

First, they were made prior to oral arguments and,

therefore, prior to any legal analysis by the district court of the
legal arguments contained in the motions for summary judgment.
Second, the district court corrected any misperception it may have
had concerning the application of plenary review after taking the
motions under advisement and thereafter issuing its well-reasoned
Memorandum Decision (See R. 341-43, Memorandum Decision, a true and
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A) .

The

Memorandum Decision reveals that the district court did not weigh
anew the underlying factual considerations of the City Council's
denial.

See, e.g., Xanthos,

685 P. 2d at 1035.

Moreover, the

Memorandum Decision provides no proof of and in fact contradicts
any notion that the district court went beyond its role and decided
the case according to its own notion of what would be in the best
interests of the citizens of Payson City.

Id.

To the contrary,

the district court merely determined, based on the almost complete
lack of evidence in the record before it, that the reasons given by
the City Council for denying the R-2-75 rezone application "are

23

without

sufficient

factual

basis."

(See R.

342, Memorandum

Decision).
Payson City Corporation also argues that the district court
failed

to

grant

the

City

Council's

decision

presumption of validity or judicial deference.

the

requisite

See Brief of

Appellant, p. 17. Again, a review of the complete record on appeal
in conjunction with the district

court's Memorandum Decision

indicates otherwise.
During a hearing intended for oral arguments on the pending
motions for summary judgment, which was well before the issuance of
its Memorandum Decision, the district court expressed concern about
the lack of basis to deny the rezone in the minutes of the public
hearings on the rezone applications (See R. 445, Transcript of
Hearing Held September

8, 1998, p. 3, lines 1-11, p. 4-5).

Consequently, the district court directed Payson City Corporation
to prepare findings setting forth the basis of the City Council's
denials of the rezone applications
Arguments; R. 284-85, Order).

(See R. 282, Minutes Oral

The district court's effort to allow

the City Council another opportunity to provide a basis for its
denials of Plaintiffs' rezone applications, which it clearly was
not required to do, is consistent with the requisite presumption of
validity vis-a-vis the statutory duty the court has to determine

24

whether

the

evidence."

land

use

Springville

decision

is

"supported

by

Citizens,

979 P.2d at 336-37.

substantial

The Memorandum Decision also demonstrates the presumption of
validity given by the district court of the City Council's decision
and, at the same time, diligently reviewing the decision for the
requisite quantum of evidence, which it is also required to do.
See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001; accord
P. 2d 336-37.

Springville

Citizens,

979

The district court, in its Memorandum Decision,

stated, "The stated reasons [by the City Council for denial of the
R-2-75

rezone request] might normally be legally sufficient.

However, they are without sufficient factual basis." (See R. 342,
Memorandum Decision).
The standard of judicial review utilized by the district court
in the instant case is consistent with the standard set forth in
both Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 and Springville

Citizens.

Memorandum Decision, the district court stated:
The Court may reverse the City Council's
denial of the zone change if the "action taken
was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and
capricious." Xanthos v, Board of Adjustment,
685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984). "Even if the
reasons given in the motion adopted by the
council might otherwise be legally sufficient,
. . . the denial of a permit is arbitrary when
the reasons are sufficient factual basis. . .
. Citizen opposition is a consideration which
must be weighted, but cannot be the sole basis
for the decision to deny." Davis County v.
Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 711 (Utah Ct.
25

In its

App. 1988) .
The Court believes that the
standard set forth in Davis County, although
that case involved a denial of an application
for a conditional use permit instead of a zone
change, involves the same legal analysis as
this case.
This standard is essentially the same standard pronounced by the
Utah Supreme Court in Springville
IV.

979 P.2d at 336-37.8

Citizens,

THE PAYSON CITY COUNCIL'S DENIAL OF THE R-2-75
REZONE REQUEST WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS BECAUSE
IT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

In the case at bar, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the
City Council's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was
not supported by substantial evidence.9

Moreover, the record

demonstrates that the City Council's decision was anything but the
result of careful consideration.

Instead of carefully considering

the

City

rezone

application,

the

Council

arbitrarily

and

capriciously stated reasons for denying Plaintiffs' rezone request
8

Payson City Corporation's own argument supports and is therefore
consistent with Plaintiffs' argument that the district court utilized
the correct standard of judicial review in the course of issuing its
Memorandum Decision. See Brief of Appellant, Argument II, pp. 17-19.
Substantial evidence is defined as "that quantum and quality of
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to
support

a

conclusion."

See

Patterson

v.

Utah

County

Bd.

of

Adjustment,

893 P.2d 602, 604 n.6 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing

First

Nat'l

of

Lake

Bank

Boston

v.

County

Bd.

of

Equalization

of

Salt

County, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990)). "It is more than a mere
'scintilla' of evidence . . . though 'something less than the weight
of the evidence.'"

Grace

Drilling

Co.

v.

Board

63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Idaho
Hunnicutt,
715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985)).
26

of Review,

State

Ins.

116 P.2d

Fund

v.

that have no evidentiary support in the record and which are in
direct contradiction to the facts and circumstances surrounding the
rezone request.
Immediately following the public hearing on the R-2-75 rezone
request, the City Council voted to deny the R-2-75 rezone "based on
the General Plan recommendation, traffic concerns relating to the
industrial park, and [the Planning Commission's] recommendation."
(See id.

at R. 231). In light of the evidence in the record, or

essentially the total lack thereof, a reasonable mind could not
reach the same conclusion as that of the City Council in the
instant case.
The City Council displayed a total lack of consistency and due
consideration when it denied the R-2-75 rezone request "based on
the General Plan recommendation" (Id.) . In direct contradiction to
the Payson City General Plan (see R. 50 and 52) , the Official
Payson City General Plan Map, which was adopted within months of
City Council's denial, expressly provides for large areas of
residential use west of 1-15
Map) .

(See R. 43, Official General Plan

The subject R-2-75 application permits residential and

density usage totally compatible with three of the four abutting
properties or communities and an overall density that is consistent
with

the large and expansive multi-family

27

neighborhood

areas

directly to the east of the Property (See R. 42, Payson Planning
Zone Map).
By citing "traffic concerns relating to the industrial park"
as a reason to deny the R-2-75 rezone application, the City Council
ignored the fact that the record is completely devoid of any
evidence before it, credible or otherwise, that the requested R-275 zone would adversely impact traffic (See R. 342, Memorandum
Decision, f3) .

The sole contrary evidence in the record were

unsupported assertions by citizens with no known experience or
training in the traffic engineering or planning fields (See R. 23133, Payson City Council Meeting Minutes, March 20, 1996).

This is

hardly the evidence upon which a reasonable mind would reasonably
rely for purposes of denying a rezone application, see

Springville

Citizens

979 P.2d

For a Better

Community v. City of Springville,

332, 336-37 (Utah 1999), particularly when viewed in light of the
fact that the Planning Commission Staff had previously recommended
that the Planning Commission recommend approval of the rezone
application (See R. 173, Planning Commission Staff Report).
Davis

County v. Clearfield,

756 P.2d 704, 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

(stating, in conditional use permit case using

capricious

-

substantial

Cf.

evidence

standard

of

arbitrary

and

review,

that

"*[c]itizen opposition is a consideration which must be weighed,
but cannot be the sole basis for the decision to deny'" and local
28

government entity "'must rely on facts, and not mere emotion or
local opinion'"

(citations omitted)).

Contrastingly, Mr. Jim

Wilbert, an expert with twenty years of planning experience,
studied the proposed rezone and then appeared before the City
Council, speaking in favor of the rezone because it "allows for
affordable housing near the industrial park." (See id.
Finally,

the

City

Council

mistakenly

relied

at 232).
upon

" [the

Planning Commission's] recommendation as a reason to deny the R-275 rezone application inasmuch as the basis upon which the Planning
Commission's recommendation was based was equally, if not more so,
factually deficient
studying

Plaintiff's

than that of the City Council's.
R-2-75

rezone

application,

the

After
Planning

Commission's own staff, by way of a Staff Report, dated March 20,
1996, recommended that the Planning Commission recommend approval
to the Payson City Council of Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application
(See R. 173, Planning Commission Staff Report).

Moreover, during

a Planning Commission Meeting On February 8, 1996, when Plaintiffs'
R-2-75 rezone application came before the Commission (See R. 16667, Payson Planning Commission Meeting Minutes, February 8, 1996),
Chairman Stewart readily acknowledged that because

"there are

already other residential developments in bhe surrounding area
where this rezone would take place, there may not be a problem in
rezoning this to R-2-7500."

(See id.).
29

Poised to recommend

approval, the Planning Commission instead recommended that the
Payson City Council deny the R-2-75 rezone after hearing the public
comments (See R. 153-55, Payson City Planning Commission Meeting
Minutes,

March

20,

1996).

The

explanation

for

the

Planning

Commission's recommendation became apparent through an Interoffice
Memo

from the

Planning

Commission

to the City Council, which

states, "The Planning Commission recommendation to the City Council
was

to

not

approve

the

[R-2-75]

zone

change

because

of

the

opposition of the neighbors in that area." (See R. Ill, Interoffice
Memo).

Consequently, it is readily apparent that any reliance by

the City Council on the Planning Commission's recommendation was
factually unfounded and fallacious.

V.

ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE "REASONABLY DEBATABLE"
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLIES TO THE CITY
COUNCIL'S
DECISION,
THE
UNDISPUTED
FACTS
DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CITY COUNCIL'S DENIAL OF
PLAINTIFFS' R-2-75 REZONE APPLICATION WAS ARBITRARY
AND CAPRICIOUS.

Even under the "reasonably debatable" standard of judicial
review set forth in Smith

Inv.

Co. v. Sandy

City,

958 P. 2d 245, 252

(Utah Ct. App. 1998), the City Council's denial of Plaintiffs' R-275 rezone application was arbitrary and capricious.10
10

In the

Smith

Plaintiffs are cognizant of the statement set forth in the
majority opinion in Harmon City,
Inc.
v. Draper City,
3 88 Utah Adv.
Rep. 24 (Utah Ct. App. February 10, 2000), where the court stated,
"Indeed, we have found no Utah case, nor a case from any other
jurisdiction, in which a zoning classification was reversed on
30

Inv.

case, the court of appeals stated, u[I]f an ordinance 'could

promote the general welfare; or even if it is reasonably debatable
that it is in the interest of the general welfare' we will uphold
it."

Id.

(quoting Marshall

v. Salt Lake City,

141 P.2d 704, 709 (1943)) (also citing Village
Realty

Co.,

105 Utah 111, 121,
of Euclid

v.

Ambler

272 U.S. 365, 388, 47 S.Ct. 114, 118 (1926)); see

3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's

§ 27A.03, at 27A-15

(1997)

The Law of

Zoning

&

also

Planning

(phrasing inquiry as whether "the

reasonableness of the action is 'fairly debatable'").
As specifically demonstrated above in Argument IV of the
instant Brief, the undisputed facts of this case demonstrate that
the City Council's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it
was not supported by evidence that makes the reasonableness of the
denial of the R-2-75 rezone application reasonably or fairly
debatable. Based the dearth of evidence before the City Council as
demonstrated by the record, there was nothing to support the
reasonableness of the denial of the R-2-75 rezone application.
While the record perhaps demonstrates that the reasonableness of

grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious."
Kanfer

v.

Montgomery

County

Council,

Id.

at 26.

But see

3 73 A.2d 5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.

1977) (reversing trial court's affirmance of denial of rezoning
classification application under "fairly debatable" rule as arbitrary
and capricious); and Hall v. Korth, 244 So.2d 766 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) (affirming trial court's reversal of county commission's
denial for rezone under "fairly debatable" rule as capricious and
without reasonable basis in the record).
31

the City Council's decision is debatable, the total lack of
evidence

precludes

reasonably

debatable.

the

City

Council's

decision

from

being

In fact, not only were the reasons given by

the City Council for denying Plaintiffs' rezone request totally
lacking in evidentiary support, there were in many ways, as
previously discussed in detail, in direct contradiction to the
record facts and circumstances surrounding the rezone request.
Payson City Corporation argues at length in its Brief that the
"public clamor" doctrine is inapplicable to the instant case
because the City Council was acting in its legislative capacity.
See Brief of Appellant, pp. 2 0-22; see also
Draper

City,

10, 2000)

Harmon City,

Inc.

v.

388 Utah Adv. Rep. 24, 27-28 (Utah Ct. App. February
(holding "public clamor" doctrine inapplicable when

legislative body acts in legislative capacity).11

By so arguing,

Payson City Corporation misperceives the underlying basis for the
district court's determination that City Council's decision was
arbitrary and capricious.

That being that there was an absence of

factual basis and evidentiary support for the decision to deny the
R-2-75 rezone application

(See R. 341-43, Memorandum Decision

("There being no sufficient factual basis for the decision to deny

u

Payson City Corporation's position concerning "public clamor"
is indeed dubious inasmuch as it fails to cite any authority that
expressly states that "public clamor" is applicable only in the
limited circumstances involving an administrative decision.
32

Plaintiffs' application, the Court finds that the decision was
based solely on citizen opposition and was therefore arbitrary and
capricious.").
Plaintiffs' acknowledge that the City Council appropriately
held a public hearing and allowed interested parties to provide
their ideas and opinions on the proposed rezone.

However, the

consideration of public input is only part of the information to be
considered by the City Council prior to approving or denying a
rezone application.

In Gayland

v.

Salt

Lake

County,

11 Utah 2d

307, 358 P.2d 633 (1961), which was a zoning case, the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
[I]t is entirely appropriate to hold public
hearings and to allow any interested parties
it desires to give information and to present
their ideas on the matter. But this is by no
means the only source from which the
commissioners may obtain such information.
From the fact that they hold public offices it
is to be assumed that they have wide knowledge
of the various conditions and activities in
the county bearing on the question of proper
zoning, such as the location of businesses,
schools, roads and traffic conditions, growth
in population and housing, the capacity of
utilities, the existing classification of
surrounding property, and the effect that the
proposed reclassification may have on these
things
and
upon
the
general
orderly
development of the county.
In performing
their duty it is both their privilege
and

obligation
to take into consideration
their
own knowledge of such matters
and also
to
gather available
pertinent
information
from
all possible sources and give consideration
to
it in making their
determination.
33

Id.

at 636 (Emphasis added).
In the instant case, the record indisputably reveals that the

City Council relied merely on public comment in the course of
denying Plaintiffs' R-2-75 rezone application.

Moreover, the

reasons provided by the City Council for its denial were in direct
contradiction to the actual facts and circumstances surrounding the
proposed rezone.

Hence, the reasonableness of the City Council's

decision is not even "fairly debatable."
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs respectfully ask that this
Court affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of
Plaintiffs and for any other relief the Court deems just or
appropriate under the circumstances.
STATEMENT REGARDING METHOD OF DISPOSITION
Plaintiffs' counsel requests that the method of disposition of
the

instant

appeal

be

by

opinion

designated

"For

Official

Publication" for purposes of precedential value in future cases due
to the significant issues in the instant appeal dealing with, among
other things, the standard of judicial review to be utilized for
reviewing municipal land use decisions pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9-1001.

The aforementioned issues concern novel matters that

are of continuing public interest and which, based on the facts of
34

the instant appeal, involve issues requiring further development in
the municipal land use decisions, which would benefit both the bar
and public, respectively.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of April, 2000.
JD\& W I G G I N S ,

P.C.

Scott T ^ i g g M s
A t t o r n e y s «£sZ£> P l a i n t i f f s
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CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused to
be mailed by First Class Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true and
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following
on this 26th day of April, 2000:
Mr. Jody K Burnett
Williams & Hunt
257 East 20JL Sou
Salt Lak
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ADDENDUM
Addendum A:

Memorandum Decision

Tab A

Fourth Judic^Distrid: Courtt of

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION

ROBERT BRADLEY, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 970400264
DATE: January 21,1999

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

PAYSON CITY CORPORATION,

LAW CLERK: DaveBackman
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court upon Plaintiffs' and Defendant's cross Motions for
Summary Judgment. Having received and considered the Motions, together with memoranda in
support of and opposition to the Motions, the Court hereby grants Plaintiffs' Motion, denies
Defendant's Motion, and delivers the following Memorandum Decision.
Statement of Facts
Plaintiffs applied to Payson City to change the zone of their propertyfromR-l-A to R2-75. Upon initial review of the application, the Planning Commission Staff issued an interoffice
memo to the Mayor and the City Council members recommending approval of the zone change
and for the Planning Commission and the City Council to hold a joint public hearing on the
matter. On March 20, 1996, a joint public hearing was held and several landowners in the area
expressed their opinions concerning the proposed change. After the public hearing, the Planning
Commission voted to recommend denial of the zone change based on the opinions expressed at
the public hearing. The City Council then voted to deny the change based on: (1) how it would
be contrary to the General Plan; (2) traffic concerns relating to the industrial park; and (3) the
Planning Commission's recommendation.

Opinion of the Court
Summary judgment is proper only if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." URCP 56(c). The Court must
view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Higgins v. Salt Lake County.
855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993).
The Court may reverse the City Council's denial of the zone change if the "action taken
was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious." Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685
P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984). "Even if the reasons given in the motion adopted by the council
might otherwise be legally sufficient,... the denial of a permit is arbitrary when the reasons are
without sufficient factual basis.... Citizen opposition is a consideration which must be weighed,
but cannot be the sole basis for the decision to deny." Davis County v. Clearfield CityT 756 P.2d
704, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Court believes that the standard set forth in Davis County.
although that case involved a denial of an application for a conditional use permit instead of a
zone change, involves the same legal analysis as this case.
The Courtfindsthat the City Council's decision to deny Plaintiffs' first application was
arbitrary and capricious. The City Council stated that it based its decision on: (1) how the zone
change would be contrary to the General Plan; (2) traffic concerns relating to the industrial park;
and (3) the Planning Commission's recommendation. The stated reasons might normally be
legally sufficient. However, they are without sufficient factual basis. The traffic concern was not
a sufficient reason for the denial since there was no evidence before the City Council that the
proposed zone change would in fact create traffic concerns. Also, there was no factual basis to
rely on the Planning Commission's recommendation. The Planning Commission initially
recommended approving the application and then changed its mind after the public hearing on
March 20, 1996. The only reasons the Commission gave for its sudden reversal were the
comments the neighbors made at the public hearing. Accordingly, the City Council's reliance on
the Commission's recommendation was factually unfounded. Similarly, neither the Planning
2

Commission nor the City Council provided any factual basis for the reason that the zone change
would be contrary to the General Plan. The Court notes thatfromthe zoning maps provided to
the Court it appears that there are already residentially zoned areas on the west side of the 1-15
buffer. The mere fact that Plaintiffs' property is on the west side does not establish that it is
contrary to the General Plan.
There being no sufficient factual basis for the decision to deny Plaintiffs' application, the
Courtfindsthat the decision was based solely on citizen opposition and was therefore arbitrary
and capricious. Having reversed the denial of the application for a zone changefromR-l-A to
R-2-75, the Court need not analyze the denial of the second application.
Order
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The zone change
from R-l-A to R-2-75 is hereby approved. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

DATED this

cc:

day of January, 1999.

Mark E. Arnold, Attorney for Plaintiffs
Diana L. Garrett, Attorney for Plaintiffs
David C. Tuckett, Attorney for Payson City
David L. Church, Attorney for Payson City
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